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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Charles

Joseph

Mumme timely appeals from the district court's

order

relinquishing jurisdiction and its order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) motion. On appeal, Mr. Mumme argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with
various transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense.

Mr. Mumme

also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 39889 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Mumme was charged, by
Information, with two counts of grand theft. (R. Vol. I, pp.33-34.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Mr. Mumme pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft and, in return, the
remaining count was dismissed. (R. Vol. I, pp.34, 51-58.) Thereafter, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Mumme on probation. (R. Vol. I, pp.59-64.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation wherein
it alleged that Mr. Mumme violated various terms of his probation. (R. Vol. I., p.67-68.)
Based on the allegations contained in the report of probation violation the State, in
docket number 30890 (hereinafter, Second Case), charged Mr. Mumme, by Information,
with grand theft, to which he pleaded guilty.

(R. Vol. II, pp.201-202.)1

Based on

Mr. Mumme's guilty plea in the Second Case, the district court found that Mr. Mumme

1

violated the terms of his probation in the First Case. (R. Vol. I, pp.84-85.) In the First
Case, the district court revoked probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R. Vol. I., pp.8793.) In the Second Case, the district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of six
years, with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., Vol. II, pp.231-234.) After
review of Mr. Mumme's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district
court relinquished jurisdiction in both cases. (R. Vol. I, pp.95-96; R. Vol. II, pp.238-239.)
In both cases, Mr. Mumme then filed a Rule 35 motion which was denied by the
district court. 2 (R. Vol. 11,336-337,338-334; R. Vol. I, pp.121-127.) Mr. Mumme timely
appealed in both cases. (R., Vol. I, pp.128-131; R., Vol. II, pp.345-348.)
On appeal, Mr. Mumme filed a motion to augment the record with various items
and to suspend the briefing schedule pending the preparation of those transcripts.
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-3.)

Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme

Court entered an order denying Mr. Mumme's request for a transcript of the admit/deny
hearing, held on May 26, 2011, the dispositional hearing, held on July 11, 2011, and the
Addendum

to

October 27, 2011.

the

Presentence

Investigation

(hereinafter,

APSI),

filed

on

(Order Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing

Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.) 3

The Information in the Second Case was not included in the Clerk's Record.
Accordingly, a motion to augment has been filed concurrently with this brief.
2 The Rule 35 motion only appears in the Second Case's clerk's record. However, it
bears the district court case numbers of both the First and Second Cases. (R., Vol. II.,
p.336.) Morover, a separate order denying each Rule 35 motion was entered by the
district court. (R. Vol. I, pp.121-127; R., Vol. II, pp.338-344.) As such, Mr. Mumme
incorporates the Rule 35 motion from the Second Case into the First Case by this
reference.
3 The Supreme Court also denied Mr. Mumme's request for the APSI, filed on
October 27, 2011. Upon further review, it appears that the APSI is currently in the
1

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Mumme due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Mumme's Rule 35
motion requesting leniency in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter?

record on appeal. As such, Mr. Mumme is not challenging the Supreme Court's denial
of his request for the APSI.

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Mumme Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Mumme filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of the
admit/deny hearing, held on May 26, 2011, and the dispositional hearing, held on
July 11, 2011. These requests for the transcripts were denied by the Supreme Court.
On appeal, Mr. Mumme is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request
for the transcripts. Mr. Mumme asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the
issue of whether abused its discretion by denying Mr. Mumme's Rule 35 motion,
because those items fall within the applicable standard of review. Therefore, the Idaho
Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

4

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Mumme Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With
The Necessary Transcripts
1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Mumme With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate
Review Of His Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST.
art. I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221 , 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a).
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to

5

be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R.54.7(a).
An appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. I/Iinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts

6

themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-based appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."

State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.

Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
9

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Mumme fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Mumme's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district
court at the time of the Rule 35 hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)

(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
10

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
sentencing decision currently on appeal.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
11

this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Mumme is challenging
the length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing
rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made
appropriate sentencing determinations.

See State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189

(Ct. App. 1985) ("Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted
at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce."); See a/so State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."
(emphasis added)).4

4 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4. As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and Mr. Mumme is raising
a sentencing claim in this appeal.

12

Further support for Mr. Mumme's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id. The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because Mr. Warren had failed to provide a copy of the
original PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the
original sentence was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue,
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address
Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that
hearing was created before the probation violation hearing or that the district court
referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.
It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would

address the nature of the original offense.

Had Mr. Mumme failed to request the

transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion indicates that they would be presumed to
support the district court's decision to execute the original sentence.

13

In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Mumme's request for the transcripts
will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Mumme's appellate sentencing claims on the merits,
and therefore, Mr. Mumme should either be provided with the requested transcripts or
the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Mumme With
Access To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
14

of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Mumme has not obtained
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
15

counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . ., Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-S.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Mumme on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Mumme is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Mumme his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mumme's I.C.R. 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency In light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In This Matter
Mr. Mumme argues that the concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two
years fixed, and six years, with three years fixed, are unduly harsh when they are
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viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter.

A motion to alter an

otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the
sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the
sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253

(Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Mumme does not allege that his

sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Mumme must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
17

reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the sentence was not
excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view
of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006).
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Mumme provided new information in the
form of medical records which provides a medical explanation for his inability to
complete his rider programming. (R. Vol. I, pp.99-118; R., Vol. II, pp.242-261, 265-335.)
At the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Mumme's trial counsel made the following comments about
Mr. Mumme's rider performance and his medical condition:
[Mr. Mumme represented] that he had completed all [the] course work but
wasn't able to graduate from [those courses] because he was terminated
from the rider. And that's ... consistent with the medical records on the
16th of October.
So shortly after receiving the medical care, which was on the 23rd
of September, he was not released from treatment for about another week
and a half [due toJ post-operative treatment. That takes him into the first
of October, and then he's terminated from the program.

He had completed all of his assignments and workbooks. He only
missed the session during the time he was in the surgery. So he was
completing all those. He didn't have any redos.

(02/21/12 Tr., p.27, L.24. - p.28, L.15.) Trial counsel went on to argue as follows:
And so looking at the totality of the report, I think it's inconsistent
with his successful completion of all the class work and course work and
assignments and doing all those things and following the rules about ...
[expressing his anger] ... and maybe he still has a [way] to go, and then
you have the complication of this medical condition, which is confirmed,
then they say, "You didn't do your program."
And I think the report is inconsistent in the conclusion when we
know all the facts.
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(02/21/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-16.) According to Mr. Mumme, he was performing well on his

rider and woke up one morning with an inflammation next to his eye. 5
Tr., p.38, L.25 - p.39, L.11.)

(02/21/12

Mr. Mumme filed inmate request form for medical

treatment which was ignored for two weeks, until his eye was swollen shut, turning
black, and painful. (02/21/12 Tr., p.39, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Mumme was then taken to Dr.
Cornwell who determined Mr. Mumme needed surgery after only five minutes of
observation. (02/21/12 Tr., p.39, L.20 - pAO, L.6.) Mr. Mumme argues that he was
partially terminated from his rider due to the surgery and for that reason the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
There are also mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
Specifically, Mr. Mumme received a support letter from his employer at Whisper Creek
Log Homes which stated as follows:
[Mr. MummeJ is out Team Lead for our Planning Department and
supervises three team members.
Charles has shown himself to be an essential asset to our company
and has had full responsibility for the development, implementation and
continuing success of that department. He effectively interacts with other
departments and is a key factor in the completion of our workload.
He is a conscientious, hard-working individual who not only
completes jobs in a timely fashion, but [alsoJ exceeds our every
expectation.
(Letter from Thomas Nate dated June 6,2008.)
Additionally, Mr. Mumme has support from his sister and was living with her
before he went on his rider. (2011 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),

This inflammation was probably caused by a spider bite. (R., Vol. I, pp.125; R. Vol. II,
pp.342.)
5
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p.6.) At that time, he was also married and in a "loving relationship" with his wife. (2011
PSI, p.7.)
Finally, Mr. Mumme accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his
actions in both cases. (06/09/08 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-10, p.27, Ls.12-18; 07/11/11 Tr., p.20,
Ls.4-16.)
In sum, Mr. Mumme had a surgery which inhibited his ability to successfully
program on his rider.

When that is viewed in light of the other mitigating factors, it

supports the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Mumme

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Mumme respectfully requests that
this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentences.

Alternatively, Mr. Mumme

respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 25 th day of October, 2012.
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SHAWN F. WIL~KERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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